| I spy with my little eye... |
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Even top class players are sometimes guilty of it: reasoning from their own hand. The danger in doing so is that a player's defensive play is based on what he can see, but his partner can't. As a consequence 'the other side of the table' can go terribly wrong. 1998, New York. The Cavendish is a big money event. Every deal's score is compared with the scores of all other tables in IMPs. Meaning there are a lot of IMPs to be won or lost at each deal.
Quantin's 2♠ bid showed a second suit and was a game trial. Having an extra trump (the French open five-card majors, so North could have raised on only three hearts as well) and a useful doubleton in spades (so he hoped), Abécassis thought he had enough to bid 4♥. Critics will call it either a brave or reckless bid, depending on the result... Moss won the third trick with the ♠9. The first trick had made it clear that his partner had the ♣Q. He continued with the ♣7. A big mistake. He knew the club layout, but his partner didn't. Gitelman thought his partner had ♣10987 in clubs (though one might ask why West didn't play back the ♣9 or the ♣8 from that holding) and declarer ♣AK3. So he let West's ♣7 ride by ducking! This disaster should have been avoided. West doesn't even have to cash the ♣K in order to continue with a small club (that would be embarrassing if East had started with only one trump and ♣Qx — though this layout is impossible in view of the bidding). All he has to do is play back the ♣9 instead of the ♣7. Nothing can go wrong. Partner will let the ♣9 ride if dummy ducks. And if dummy covers with the ♣J, East of course covers with the ♣Q. |
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